Inquisitorial forensic DNA profiling in the Netherlands and the expansion of the forensic genetic body by Toom, Victor
Preferred citation: Toom, V. 2010. "Inquisitorial forensic DNA profiling in the Netherlands and the expansion of the forensic 
genetic body." in Hindmarsh, R. and Prainsack, B. (eds.), Genetic Suspects. Global Governance of Forensic DNA Profiling and 
Databasing 175-196. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
 
 
A slightly adjusted version of this article is published in Hindmarsh, R., & Prainsack, B. (Eds.). 
(2010). Genetic Suspects. Global Governance of Forensic DNA Profiling and Databasing. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. The volume and some of the chapter can be downloaded 
from http://www.cambridge.org/gb/knowledge/isbn/item5562820/?site_locale=en_GB   
 
 
 
 
ter 9 – Inquisitorial forensic DNA profiling in the 
Netherlands and the expansion of the forensic genetic body 
Victor Toom 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This chapter describes how Dutch DNA profiling became governed through legal measures and the 
inquisitorial orientation of the Dutch legal system. Secondly, the trajectory – the lines of 
development – of Dutch DNA profiling practices is described, outlining who and what has been 
involved in DNA profiling. This account provides insight into first, strategies employed by various 
stakeholders to deploy DNA profiling extensively and routinely in volume crimes, and, second, to 
apply DNA profiling in the process of crime investigations. The analysis contributes to the 
understanding of how current DNA profiling practices were realised in a country – the Netherlands – 
with an ‘inquisitorial legal orientation’, where judges and other involved jurists in legal cases act 
impartially. Finally, some implications for current directions in the governance of Dutch forensic DNA 
profiling practices are highlighted, especially the view that broad and informed public debates need 
to better address and resolve the many issues arising with regard to forensic genetic bodies and the 
civic protection of genetic suspects. 
 
INTRODUCTION  Chap
 During the 1990s in the Netherlands, DNA profiling became established as a mechanism to provide 
legal evidence for severe, violent crimes, including sexual assault, manslaughter and murder. That 
development was in accord with what Williams and Johnson (2008C009-033: 1) have observed in many 
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jurisdictions regarding the transformation of DNA profiling into an important tool in processes of 
crime investigation and usage in so-called ‘volume crimes’. Drawing upon the Dutch situation, in this 
paper I first describe how Dutch DNA profiling became governed through legal measures and the 
inquisitorial orientation of the Dutch legal system. Secondly, I describe the trajectory – the lines of 
development – of Dutch DNA profiling practices, outlining who and what has been involved in DNA 
profiling. This account will provide insight into, first, the strategies employed by various stakeholders 
to achieve the current situation, where DNA profiling is deployed extensively and routinely in 
volume crimes, and, second, DNA profiling applied in the process of crime investigations. Hence, my 
analysis contributes to the understanding of how current DNA profiling practices were realised in a 
country – the Netherlands – with what I refer to as an ‘inquisitorial legal orientation’, where judges 
evaluate legal cases impartially.1 Finally, I highlight some implications for current directions in the 
governance of Dutch forensic DNA profiling practices. 
 
DNA PROFILING IN THE NETHERLANDS: LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWS Most Continental European legal systems, including that of the Netherlands, are organised according 
to an inquisitorial principle. Van Kampen (1998C009-006: 48) compared the Dutch and American legal 
systems regarding admissibility of forensic evidence. She found that the Dutch inquisitorial legal 
system rests on the assumption that different members of the system working on legal cases – 
judges, prosecutors, police officers, and experts – act impartially, fairly and expediently. Whereas 
‘adversarial’ forensic evidence, as examined in US courts, is sceptically regarded and questioned 
intensively by lawyers and prosecutors, inquisitorial forensic evidence is attached to a practice that 
puts trust in experts, legal professionals and institutes. 
Trust in Dutch forensic evidence has been achieved through the institutionalising of dealings with 
forensic technologies on various levels. First, the Netherlands Forensic Institute (NFI) is an agency of 
the Ministry of Justice and is under the Directorate-General for Law Enforcement. This means that 
the Minister of Justice is responsible for the NFI as an impartial, fair and expedient organisation. 
Second, the role and functions of expert witnesses and the NFI are circumscribed in the Code of 
Criminal Procedure. The Code prescribes, among other things, that expert witnesses have to take an 
oath that they will competently perform their tasks, like drafting a written testimony or being in 
‘good conscience’ when they appear in court as expert witnesses. After taking the oath, an expert 
witness is installed permanently. Third, expert evidence usually takes the form of documents, for 
example, of DNA evidence, autopsies or drug analyses, which are supposed to be unbiased and 
neutral; however, expert witnesses themselves hardly ever appear in Dutch courts and are thus 
hardly ever questioned or cross-examined.2 
                                                 
1 In an inquisitorial legal system it is the suspect who is the object of the process of finding juridical truth. The 
Office of Public Prosecution leads the process of criminal investigation, makes the decision on bringing legal 
cases and suspects to court, and prosecutes, and judges actively search for truth during court proceedings 
and impose sanctions. See Van Kampen (1998C009-006) for further elaboration on the differences between 
‘inquisitorial’ and ‘adversarial’ legal systems. 
2 For exceptions, see: M’charek (2005C009-010), Bal (2005C009-001). 
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DNA evidence has a somewhat special position within Dutch forensic practices. In the early 1990s, 
the Minister of Justice decided that DNA profiling should be governed through special DNA profiling 
legislation to form a fourth mode of institutionalising forensic evidence. In September 1994, the 
Forensic DNA Profiling Act (Staatsblad 1993C009-024) came into force. This law mainly sought to 
regulate two aspects of DNA profiling. First, it became a legal possibility to issue a compulsory ‘body 
search’ (the legal term) of individuals suspected of having committed severe and violent crimes – 
such as murder, homicide and sexual assault – to obtain blood (on medical grounds, saliva or hair 
roots could also be obtained) for DNA profiling. Second, the law laid down various measures to 
ensure the reliability of DNA evidence. It stipulates, for example, that only DNA profiles produced in 
a laboratory with accreditation according to international standards (ISO 17025) may be used as 
DNA evidence in court. 
In November 2001, an amendment was added (Staatsblad 2001C009-026), which offered an important 
widening of the scope and applicability of DNA profiling. Most importantly, individuals suspected of 
having committed more minor crimes like theft, break-ins, and mistreatment or being a (severe) 
public nuisance – so-called volume crimes – could be body-searched to obtain saliva for DNA 
profiling. Another amendment was issued in 2003 (Staatsblad 2003C009-027). This amendment, the 
Law on External Visible Personal Characteristics, allowed for the forensic DNA determination of the 
‘sex’ and ‘race’ of an unknown originator of crime scene samples (see also Washington this volume 
with regard to the US situation on the latter aspect). The amendment belongs to the category of so-
called ‘window’ legislation, as it leaves room for other externally visible traits, for example, colour of 
hair or eyes, to be included through an Order in Council. 
The most recent Dutch law was enacted in 2005: the DNA Convicted Persons Act (Staatsblad 
2004C009-028). Since this Act came into force, persons convicted of offences (that is, sentenced to 
imprisonment, community service orders, hospital orders, placed in psychiatric hospitals or in penal 
institutions for systematic offenders or institutions for juvenile offenders) carrying statutory 
maximum prison sentences of at least four years will be obliged to provide DNA samples. Currently, 
new amendments are being considered, pertaining, for example, to familial searching and DNA 
dragnets (see: Ministerie van Justitie 2008aC009-014). The Netherlands is also a signatory to the Prüm 
Treaty, which merged Dutch DNA profiling into a European data-sharing endeavour (see Chapter 2 
this volume). 
 
THE DUTCH DNA DATABASE 
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3 Availabl the Dutch forensic DNA database was established. By September 2009, the database 
d more than 132 000 DNA profiles, all from a population of some 16 million. Of DNA profiles 
 in the database, 88 026 are reference profiles, also known as subject profiles. Reference 
are derived from persons whose identity is known to the authorities. The remaining 40 192 
files are derived from crime scene traces.3 The 2001 amendment and the 2005 law in 
r, contributed importantly to this number of DNA profiles. 
                                     
e from: http://dnadatabank.forensischinstituut.nl/. 
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Figure 9.1 here 
Most reference profiles (subject profiles) originate from convicted individuals, but they also include 
suspects and deceased victims. The DNA profile of a convict is stored for 20 years after a person is 
convicted for a crime laid down in the Penal Code that carries a sentence of less than six years 
imprisonment. In contrast, DNA profiles are stored for 30 years when a person is convicted for a 
crime with carrying a sentence with six years or more imprisonment. Retention periods for reference 
(subject) and evidentiary (traces) samples are the same as for DNA profiles. The DNA profile and the 
biological sample of a suspect are removed if the suspect is not convicted. DNA profiles obtained 
from crime scene traces are removed when the originator of the sample has been convicted or when 
the public prosecutor decides not to use the match to prosecute the suspect. DNA profiles and 
samples of deceased victims, as well as crime scene profiles and traces, are stored for 12 years if 
they are related to crimes carrying a sentence of less than six years imprisonment. They are stored 
for 20 years if they are related to crimes carrying a sentence of six years or more imprisonment, and 
80 years in cases of crimes punishable with life imprisonment. About 90 per cent of matches 
between crime scene profiles and subject profiles pertain to volume crimes like burglary and (car) 
theft (NFI 2008C009-018). 
Above, I mentioned the trajectory of DNA profiling, which in some ways is the same as in many other 
jurisdictions which have introduced forensic DNA technologies. The Dutch situation, however, sheds 
light on how DNA profiling practices were transformed in a legal system with an inquisitorial 
orientation; from being used on a case-to-case basis in severe, violent crimes, to their now routine 
deployment in volume crimes. This begs the question: Why and how did this happen? In addition, 
how did the function of DNA profiles change from their use as evidence in courts, to their informing 
processes of crime investigation? In exploring such transformations, three historical phases can be 
distinguished. First, during 1989–1997, DNA profiling was introduced into the courts and became 
established as evidence for violent crimes. Second, during 1997–2001, new forensic DNA profiling 
technologies were introduced that led to the extension of DNA profiling beyond the scope of serious 
crimes to the realm of volume crimes. Third, the years post-2001 highlight the increasing room given 
to DNA profiling practices, with new criteria for ‘body searches’, a redistribution of responsibilities 
and competences, and DNA profiling becoming increasingly used for criminal investigation. After 
exploring these transformations, I discuss some implied challenges for governance. 
 
DUTCH DNA PROFILING PRACTICES: 1989–1997 When Alec Jeffreys and colleagues invented DNA profiling in the mid-1980s, the technique was 
dependent on biological materials containing large amounts of DNA, that is, DNA extracted from 
reference blood, or DNA extracted from stains of blood and semen of about one square centimetre. 
Usually, such amounts of (crime related) DNA could be found at crime scenes or on the corpus delicti 
of serious violent crimes, but absent from less-severe or non-violent crimes like burglary. 
Soon, in the late 1980s, DNA profiling was introduced in the Netherlands. Initially, various suspects 
delivered blood samples voluntarily to prove their innocence. But it was not long before a 
compulsory body search was issued in a legal case brought against an individual suspected of rape. 
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The suspect appealed successfully against this order. The case was finally brought to the Dutch 
Constitutional Court and it led to the so-called ‘saliva decision’ (Hoge Raad 1990C009-004). This decision 
ruled that taking blood from the veins or saliva from the inner cheeks comprised a breach of the 
right to inviolability of the body, a basic right articulated in Article 11 of the Dutch Constitution and 
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
To address this situation, and apply DNA profiling in serious crimes, Dutch law had to be changed 
(Toom 2006C009-029). In September 1994, the Forensic DNA Profiling Act came into force. For the first 
time in Dutch history, a compulsory body search could be issued to obtain blood, saliva and hair 
roots for DNA profiling. It was considered by the law to be proportionate if someone was suspected 
of a crime with a penalty of eight years of imprisonment or more. Crimes that incur eight or more 
years of imprisonment include severe, violent crimes like sexual assault, manslaughter and murder. 
Special measures were laid down to protect the rights of suspects. Only examining judges were 
allowed to order a bodily search for (both compulsory and voluntary) DNA analysis; DNA profiling 
had to be assessed as vital for finding ‘the truth’; suspicion had to be backed up by facts and 
circumstances; a suspect needed to be asked to cooperate at least two times without success; only a 
licensed physician was allowed to take the sample; and samples were to be destroyed when the case 
at hand no longer demanded their availability. The law allowed digital storage of DNA profiles in a 
DNA database. 
 
DUTCH DNA PROFILING PRACTICES: 1997–2001 Soon after the Forensic DNA Profiling Act came into force, new genetic technologies found forensic 
applications. First, polymerase chain reaction (PCR), a technology to copy specific strands of DNA 
millions of times, was introduced. Traces containing only small bloodstains, saliva or flakes of skin 
sufficed for reliable DNA profiling. Second, short tandem repeats (STRs) were shown to produce 
reproducible results between different laboratories using different DNA profiling methods, thereby 
remedying problems regarding production and interpretation of DNA profiling techniques as 
developed by Jeffreys and his colleagues (see Aronson this volume). Third, geneticists of the British 
Forensic Science Services (FSS) combined PCR and STRs in standardised multiplex DNA profiling kits, 
which rendered DNA profiling cheaper and faster to use. A second generation multiplex (SGM) DNA 
profiling system followed that was considered ‘a highly discriminating and reliable individual 
identification tool suitable for both routine forensic applications and intelligence database 
construction’ (Sparkes et al. 1996: 201).4 In 1997, at the same time that the Dutch DNA database was 
activated, the Netherlands Forensic Institute (NFI) received accreditation for SGM from the Dutch 
Accreditation Council. This meant that SGM profiles could become legal DNA evidence. 
 
A DRAFT LAW PROPOSAL, THE ‘DNA & BURGLARY’ PROJECT AND THE ‘ALBIN’ CASE Following these technological innovations, in 1997, Ministry of Justice policymakers drafted a law 
amendment to the above mentioned 1994 Forensic DNA Profiling Act (Ministerie van Justitie 
                                                 
4 A later version of SGM (SGM+) is now applied in forensic laboratories internationally. 
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1997C009-012). The drafted amendment provided that DNA profiles should be derived from saliva 
rather than blood samples. Taking a buccal swab was considered a less severe violation of the right 
of inviolability of the body. Thus, it was proposed that an order to obtain a sample by an examining 
judge would be no longer required if a suspect provided a sample voluntarily, and that the objective 
of ‘finding [the] truth’, as laid down in the 1994 law, would no longer be required to obtain a DNA 
sample from a suspect. Instead, it was proposed that there was sufficient reason for taking a sample 
if it could be seen as being ‘in the interest of the investigation’. These measures, it was argued, 
would lead to beneficial effects, like a larger DNA database to combat crime. Nevertheless, despite 
the fact that taking saliva rather than blood samples was seen as a less severe violation of the right 
of inviolability of the body, it was not proposed at the time to extend the use of DNA profiling to 
other, less severe, crimes like theft and burglary. 
In the summer of 1997, the law proposal was submitted to key stakeholders such as police officials 
and legal experts.5 The Netherlands Bar Association found the law proposal overly far-reaching on 
two counts. First, the violation of bodies was considered so severe that it was argued that high 
thresholds – that is, ‘vital for finding truth’ – should remain. Second, the Bar Association argued that 
only examining judges should be able to assess the necessity of a body search. Other consulted 
organisations found the proposal too conservative and advocated lowering the threshold for 
mandatory DNA profiling from eight years to four years of imprisonment based on the argument 
that taking a saliva sample could hardly be recognised as a violation of the body and thus as an 
infringement of bodily integrity.6 
The reason given in the draft law proposal for restricting DNA profiling to severe, violent crimes was 
that: ‘DNA research usually seems to contribute little to the investigative process solving break-ins. 
In general, no blood or saliva left by the perpetrator is found at crime scenes of theft’ (Ministerie van 
Justitie 1997C009-012, author’s translation). This quote, however, surprised the former head of the Unit 
of Forensic and Technical Research of the Midden & West Brabant police district. When I 
interviewed this official in the summer of 2006, he disagreed with this line of reasoning: 
I had read the explanatory memorandum [of the draft law proposal]. It was said that the threshold EXT  would not be lowered to four years of imprisonment, because in practice it has been shown that few 
biological traces are found [at crime scenes of less severe crimes]. Then I thought: ‘That is not true. 
We do not collect biological traces at volume crime scenes because they do not do so much with it at 
the NFI. You’re not going to collect traces that won’t be used.’ 
According to this police official, thieves, for example, do leave biological traces; those traces, 
however, are usually not collected because crime scene investigators know that those traces will 
simply not be analysed. The reason for this is the limited resources available to the NFI, and the fact 
                                                 
5 The draft law proposal was submitted to police organizations (Criminal Intelligence Service of the National 
Police Services Agency; Netherlands Police Institute; Board of Chief Superintendents), the NFI, the Board of 
Procurators General, Council for the Judiciary, the Netherlands Bar Association, the Dutch Organisation for 
Help to Victims, and the Royal Dutch Medical Organisation. 
6 When the law proposal was submitted in November 1998, many Members of Parliament aired the opinion 
that taking a saliva sample could hardly be recognised as a violation of the body. Only the members of the 
Green Liberal Party (GroenLinks) and the Socialist Party agreed to maintenance of the high thresholds (see: 
Tweede Kamer 1999aC009-031). 
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that typically most burglary suspects cannot be issued a compulsory body search to obtain blood for 
DNA profiling (to compare the crime scene stains with their DNA). After reading the draft law 
proposal, the official of the police district Midden & West Brabant organised a meeting with 
colleagues of the Utrecht police force and NFI officials. Together they decided to initiate a pilot 
project called ’DNA & burglary‘ to support the case for lowering the threshold from eight to four 
years of imprisonment based on the argument that forensic DNA could well contribute to juridical 
‘truth-finding’. Before the project began in January 1998, the Offices of Public Prosecution (districts 
Breda and Utrecht) were enrolled into it. Forms were especially designed and printed so as to 
efficiently streamline the various administrative acts. It was decided to run the project for six 
months, but this was extended to a year after a donation of €45,300 from the Ministry of Justice. 
The project was carried out in accordance with the 1994 Forensic DNA Profiling Act. To limit the 
workload for the NFI, the submission of DNA traces – like blood, cigarette butts, saliva and hairs – 
collected from volume crime scenes was restricted to a maximum of 60 traces monthly, meaning 
that both police districts (Midden & West Brabant, Utrecht) were allowed to submit 30 biological 
samples each month. 
Three questions lay at the heart of the ‘DNA & burglary’ project. First, do burglars typically leave 
DNA traces? Second, would it be possible to produce usable DNA profiles from those traces? Third, 
do DNA profiles, after being stored in the Dutch DNA database, contribute effectively to solving 
volume crimes like burglary? The project ran from January until December 1998. During this period, 
a total of 562 biological traces were collected and submitted to the NFI. Subsequently, 391 DNA 
profiles were produced and uploaded to the DNA database (DNA bij inbraken 1999C009-003). The 
project thus demonstrated that biological traces could indeed be found at volume crime scenes and 
that most could be analysed, thus answering the first two questions. 
The third question dealt with the DNA database, which had been operational since 1997. In its first 
calendar year, 49 DNA profiles, broken down into 28 reference DNA profiles and 21 DNA traces, 
were uploaded to the DNA database (NFI 2008C009-018: 10). In 1998, during the second calendar year, 
and the year that the project ‘DNA & burglary’ ran, a total of 708 DNA traces were uploaded. The 
project ‘DNA & burglary’ contributed 391 DNA traces to the total amount, and, with the use of the 
DNA database, 137 matches were established. In one case, it was found that a suspect’s DNA profile 
matched DNA traces collected at 16 different crime scenes. This case involved a person referred to 
as “Albin” (not his real name of course). Albin was suspected of having committed more than 100 
burglaries in 1998.7 His case illustrates how forensic DNA profiling became extended to the realm of 
volume crimes. My focus in illustrating this is on two identifying stickers that were placed onto a 
DNA trace (T 123) and a reference sample (P 9999), respectively. 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 The analysis is based on the criminal file compiled against ‘Albin’ (Pro Justitia, 1998C009-021). The Dutch Board 
of Procurators General gave permission to use the file on condition that the privacy of individuals (suspects, 
victims, witnesses) not be jeopardised. Consequently, I have altered the registration numbers in this 
chapter, used an alias for the suspect, and I used my own DNA profile in this chapter. 
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CONNECTING CRIME SCENES: T123 AND THE DNA DATABASE Let us revisit the following scene: one day in 1998, in the police district Midden & West Brabant, a 
burglary is reported. Later that day a crime scene investigator from the Forensic and Technical 
Department secures from the crime scene, amongst other things, a cigarette butt. It is accounted for 
as shown in Table 9.1C009-001. 
After collecting the crime scene trace and tagging it T 123, a Public Prosecutor of the Breda district 
submits T 123 to the NFI for DNA analysis. It is one of the 562 traces collected as biological evidence 
within the framework of the project ‘DNA & burglary’, and one of the 391 DNA profiles produced 
and uploaded to the DNA database. 
Table 9.1: here 
It should be mentioned here that the DNA database is administered by the NFI and is subject to legal 
regulation (Staatscourant 1994),8 which, in the early 1990s, oversighted three different systems in 
the DNA database. The first was an analogue administrative system that stored information related 
to reference DNA profiles and DNA traces on ‘datacards’. Datacards include all relevant information 
regarding the sampling and securing of tissue and production of the DNA profile, administrative 
numbers, the DNA profile, the submitted testimony, and the identifying stickers. The full name, date 
and place of birth, nationality, sex, and aliases are added to this information for reference DNA 
profiles. The second system was a digital system of reference DNA profiles. The third was a digital 
system that holds DNA profiles derived from crime-related traces. DNA profiles that are uploaded to 
the two digital systems can be linked to the identity of the originator or sample by means of 
evidentiary stickers like T 123 or P 9999, and data cards. Information that can be traced back to 
individual identities is not stored digitally.9 The format of the DNA profile that T 123 takes when it is 
uploaded to the digital DNA database is a numerical representation that gives insight into the 
amount of repeats for each marker, as shown in Table 9.2C009-002. 
Table 9.2: here 
Returning to the story, for analysis, the DNA profile T 123 is scanned for any previous entries. It soon 
appears that it matches several other DNA traces, and as a result, different crime scenes are linked 
together. As it so happens, soon after T 123 is uploaded to the DNA database, Albin is arrested on 
suspicion of burglary by the Midden & West Brabant police force. During interrogation, Albin admits 
that he, together with accomplices, has committed over 100 burglaries. After being officially 
charged, reference fingerprints and shoe prints are obtained and compared with fingerprints and 
shoe prints collected at various crime scenes, which are found to match. The police suspicion of 
Albin’s involvement in a large number of criminal offences is now backed up by evidence. 
Subsequently, DNA information is brought to the attention of the detectives by an NFI official, who 
tells them about the DNA database matches. The detectives then summarise the legal case against 
Albin and the DNA matches in a written report: 
                                                 
8 Note that this description shows how the DNA database was governed in 1998. Below, I describe the current 
governance of the DNA database. 
9 Currently, data cards are stored digitally. 
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When Albin was caught in the act of a break-in, a biological trace was collected at the scene 
of the crime which was subsequently DNA typed. It has been determined that that DNA 
profile matches DNA profiles typed from biological traces collected at ten other scenes of 
burglary (Pro Justitia 1998C009-021). 
One of the functions of the forensic DNA database is that different crime scenes can be linked to 
each other as has occurred in Albin’s case by obtaining ‘matches’ between different crime scene 
samples. But how is it possible to link Albin’s DNA profile to profiles derived from crime scene 
samples? 
 
CONNECTING ALBIN TO CRIME SCENES: P 9999 AND THE DNA DATABASE To be able to link Albin’s DNA profile to DNA traces stored in the DNA database, police and 
prosecutor prepare Albin’s case to bring it to the examining judge. The examining judge is the official 
who decides on issuing a body search to obtain blood for DNA profiling. The rules laid down in the 
1994 Forensic DNA Profiling Act are thus applied. 
At the time that public prosecutor and police approach the examining judge, Albin is suspected of 
burglary, a crime with the liability of a maximum penalty of six years of imprisonment. However, if 
there is a suspicion that a burglary occurred during the night in combination with circumstances 
indicating that those break-ins were done in cooperation with others or by forced entry, a prison 
sentence of up to nine years can be imposed. Albin was suspected of breaking in during the night, 
and opening windows using tools in cooperation with others. Hence, the series of burglaries that 
Albin is suspected of is one of the only cases, in that year of 1998, for which mandatory blood-taking 
was mandated in the context of a non-violent crime. Nevertheless, other issues have to be taken 
into account, too. Is mandatory blood-taking proportionate in this case? Is it vital for finding ‘truth’? 
In addition, how will Albin respond when the examining judge requests him to volunteer a blood 
sample? In a nutshell, the examining judge regards it as proportionate and vital for truth that a DNA 
profile of Albin be produced. But Albin volunteers a sample, hence it is not necessary to execute 
article 195d of the Code of Criminal Procedure to obtain a blood sample by force. 
After a blood sample is obtained by a licensed physician, as taking blood is considered a medical 
procedure, Albin’s reference sample is labelled with sticker P 9999. It is submitted to the NFI; the 
DNA profile is determined and finally uploaded to the DNA database. It appears to match DNA 
profiles collected at 16 different crime scenes. During the court case against Albin, this DNA 
evidence, together with other evidence (footprints and fingerprints, confessions) leads to a verdict 
of the judge that he finds it both legally and convincingly proven that Albin has committed a total of 
56 (attempted) burglaries and six car thefts. The judge sentences him to five years of imprisonment, 
which is reduced to four years following appeal. 
Albin’s case is the first of its kind in the Netherlands, where one suspect was matched by means of 
the DNA database to so many different scenes of volume crimes. An NFI DNA expert, who was 
involved with Albin’s case, wrote “MEGAHIT” on a laboratory printout. When I interviewed this DNA 
expert, she told me: 
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Official: [It was for the first time] during the project DNA & burglary that we determined DNA 
profiles from traces collected at scenes of burglary [and uploaded them to the DNA 
database]. It did not take long before we started to observe matches, with this case with 16 
matches as the highlight. It was the smash hit of the project. 
Interviewer: What did this ‘megahit’ mean for you? 
Official: This is the future. It works! It proves that our expectations regarding DNA profiling 
and databasing were right. And this is only the start; it will become huge. Now it is 10 years 
later and DNA profiling can be considered a business by itself, for instance regarding the 
Prüm Treaty. 
 
DUTCH DNA PROFILING: 2001–PRESENT 
-ext     When the project ‘DNA & burglary’ was terminated at the end of 1998, the participants evaluated 
the project and published its results in an official report in May 1999 (DNA bij inbraken 1999C009-003). 
A month later, in June, with the results presented to the Ministry of Justice, the following response 
ensued: 
Minister of Justice A. H. Korthals is considering making it possible to order a body search for 
DNA typing regarding crimes with a penalty of four years or more imprisonment. The 
threshold is currently set on crimes with an eight-year or more sentence. Lowering the 
threshold means that DNA typing can b C009-
013, author’s translation)10. 
Subsequently, in November 1999, the Minister
Parliament, which a large majority in Parliamen
law, called the Forensic DNA Profiling in Crimin
2001 (Staatsblad 2001C009-026). Most important
when someone was suspected of having comm
which included volume crimes like (car) theft, 
animals, and making a public nuisance.12 
With this expansion of DNA profiling, the NFI (
ordered up to 20 times more often when the 2
challenge to Dutch DNA profiling practices in s
expected requests, the NFI had to move to a n
                                                 
10 See also Tweede Kamer (1999bC009-032). 
11 In this document, the Minister gave three reas
‘DNA & burglary’; a decision made by the Dutc
(Hoge Raad 2000C009-005[0]); and the critique of s
the high threshold of eight years was too conser
12 Since November 2001, a compulsory body searc
Code of Criminal Procedure. This article describ
This usually is the case when someone is susp
years or more. e used more often (Ministerie van Justitie 1999
 of Justice submitted a new law proposal to 
t supported (Tweede Kamer 1999bC009-032).11 The new 
al Proceedings Law, became effective in November 
ly, it became legal for DNA profiling to be ordered 
itted a crime with a penalty of four years or more, 
breaking and entering, mistreatment of persons and 
2000C009-017: 10) predicted that DNA profiling would be 
001 amendment came into force. This posed a 
everal ways. First, in an attempt to deal with all the 
ew building with an extensive forensic DNA 
ons for lowering the threshold: the success of the project 
h Constitutional Court, the so-called ‘toothbrush decision’ 
everal Members of Parliament who found that maintaining 
vative. 
h for purposes of DNA profiling is linked to article 67 of the 
es the crimes for which someone can be taken in custody. 
ected of having committed a crime with a penalty of four 
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laboratory. It also had to hire new analysts and install new experts, buy new equipment and further 
streamline the production and administration of producing DNA profiles. Second, measures to 
protect basic rights of suspects, laid down in the 1994 law, were changed in two respects. First, it 
was decided to grant public prosecutors – the officials in charge of the process of criminal 
investigation – the same authority as the examining judge to issue an order to obtain a sample 
(saliva, blood or hair roots) from a suspect. This meant that responsibilities were shifted from an 
impartial examining judge to the leader of the process of crime investigation. Secondly, it was 
decided that medical doctors no longer were required to obtain a reference sample; police officers 
who had received special training were allowed to collect saliva or hair roots from cooperating 
suspects. Both measures can be understood as a move away from using DNA profiling as evidence in 
criminal proceedings towards an application in crime investigation. 
Since 2001, more links have been established between DNA profiling and the police. In the 
introduction to this chapter, I described the Law on External Visible Personal Characteristics, which 
allows for the forensic DNA determination of ‘sex’ and ‘race’ of an unknown originator of crime 
scene samples (Staatsblad 2003C009-027). Genetic information regarding ‘sex’ and ‘race’ is not so much 
used as evidence but is considered as an important lead which feeds into the process of criminal 
investigation. It enables detectives to focus their investigations on one group that shares a particular 
trait, like ‘race’ and/or ‘sex’. Cole and Lynch (2006C009-002: 53) use the term ‘DNA photofits’ for these 
traits and other DNA markers informative about external visible characteristics. 
DNA photofits have informed the process of criminal investigation in the Netherlands several times. 
An example is the case of ‘Milica van Doorn’. She was found murdered in the city of Zaandam in 
1992. The case was not solved. In December 2008, the Office of Public Prosecutor announced that a 
DNA photofit had been produced from biological material found near or on the body of the victim.13 
The DNA photofit indicated that the originator likely came from Turkey or North Africa. It was then 
decided to organise a DNA dragnet. A total of 75 Turkish and North African men, aged between 16 
and 30 who lived close to the crime scene at the time of the crime, were selected and requested to 
volunteer a DNA sample. At the time of this writing, 71 men were excluded as possible suspects. Yet, 
four persons still have to deliver a sample. The case remains unsolved to this day. 
Organising DNA dragnets based on DNA photofits can raise important ethical and normative 
questions. First, there is the issue that the statistical chance that the originator of the sample is likely 
to come from Turkey or North Africa was translated in news reports to a firm claim that the 
perpetrator was Turkish or North African, which, of course, did not have to be true.14 Second, and by 
association, DNA photofits have implications regarding privacy and discrimination (see also 
Washington this volume). Third, DNA photofits produce a population of ‘interesting persons’ or a 
‘suspect population’ (Cole & Lynch 2006C009-002, M’charek 2008C009-011) that must be excluded as 
possible suspects. DNA photofits link ‘suspect populations’ to crimes. Establishing such links is not a 
value-free exercise; it interferes with the relationship between civilians and the state, as the onus of 
proof, which traditionally rests with the Office of Public Prosecutor, is shifted to the ‘genetic suspect’ 
                                                 
13 ‘Opnieuw grootschalig DNA-onderzoek in oude moordzaak’ [Once more a DNA dragnet in old murder]. 
Available from: http://www.om.nl/ [accessed 31 March 2009]. 
14 ‘Turk vermoordde Milica van Doorn’ [Turk killed Milica van Doorn]. Available from: 
http://www.laatstenieuws.nl/ [accessed 31 March 2009]. 
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to prove his or her innocence. Currently, scientific research is being conducted in the Netherlands in 
an attempt to gain genetic knowledge about externally visible characteristics that may be used in 
crime investigation (see also ‘phenotypic profiling’, Chapter 2 this volume). This leads the topic of 
the next section. 
 
SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND FORENSIC APPLICATIONS Population geneticists of a Dutch university recently published their research results regarding 
genetic markers for determining eye colour (Kayser et al. 2008C009-007, Liu et al. 2009C009-009). The 
genetic materials used in these studies are derived from two biomedical research projects. The first 
project, the ‘Rotterdam project’, assesses the occurrence and determinants of chronic diseases; the 
second concerns the city of Rucpen and is part of a program titled ‘Genetic Research in Isolated 
Populations’. Both groups who donated samples to these biomedical studies were populations of 
predominantly Dutch origin (Kayser et al. 2008C009-007: 412). The findings of the geneticists led them 
to the claim that they can predict brown and blue eyes with an accuracy of respectively 93% and 
91%, and other eye colours with an accuracy of 73% (Liu et al. 2009C009-009: R192). Subsequently, the 
results led to an announcement of the NFI, in March 2009, that the Minister of Justice would be 
asked for permission to apply this technique in forensic case work (NFI 2009C009-019).15 
This research is an example of how biomedical and genetic research can converge with forensic DNA 
profiling (see also Tutton & Levitt this volume). But another route by which to gain genetic 
knowledge about externally visible characteristics has also been made available by means of the 
2001 Forensic DNA Profiling in Criminal Proceedings Law, which involved two important decisions. 
First, reference samples (the DNA provided from subjects) no longer had to be destroyed when the 
case at hand was closed. Since 2001, more than 85 000 DNA profiles have been stored, meaning that 
a similar number of reference samples originating from criminals convicted in the Netherlands is 
available. Second, the Personal Data Protection Act (Staatsblad 2000C009-025) is legally applicable to 
the DNA database, meaning that DNA profiles and biological (reference) samples both are 
understood as information (see M’charek 2008C009-011, Toom 2006C009-029, Van der Ploeg 2007C009-020). 
This allows biological reference samples to be used for scientific research, for example, to develop a 
genetic test that is informative regarding external visible characteristics. After results are proven 
(sufficiently) accurate, and the Minister of Justice allows use of the test through an Order in Council, 
the test can be used in the process of crime investigation to determine external visible 
characteristics from an unknown originator and consequently produce other ‘suspect populations’. 
This is not only a hypothetical possibility. A Dutch academic research institute currently uses – with 
the permission of the Minister of Justice (Ministerie van Justitie 2008bC009-015) – genetic material 
derived from reference samples from the DNA database. The samples are anonymised except for the 
country of birth. This is supposed to enable geneticists to develop new genetic tests informative 
about external visible personal characteristics from biological traces. This latter example and the 
above mentioned example of determining eye colour show how forensic and biomedical practices 
                                                 
15 The NFI expects that the Minister will authorise this technique through an Order in Council before the 
summer of 2010. 
Preferred citation: Toom, V. 2010. "Inquisitorial forensic DNA profiling in the Netherlands and the expansion of the forensic 
genetic body." in Hindmarsh, R. and Prainsack, B. (eds.), Genetic Suspects. Global Governance of Forensic DNA Profiling and 
Databasing 175-196. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
converge and both shape and are shaped by forensic DNA practices. I will now reflect on the 
different aspects and implications of the introduction of forensic DNA technologies in the 
Netherlands that I have focussed upon here. 
 
GOVERNING THE CHALLENGES OF FORENSIC GENETIC BODIES In this chapter, I have described the trajectory of Dutch DNA profiling practices. It has contributed 
importantly to, as Turner (2006C009-030: 228) has called it, the common understanding that the ‘code 
of the body’ is becoming a major tool in criminal investigations. To become major tools in criminal 
investigations, bodies need to be discursively reconstructed (Williams & Johnson 2008C009-033: 97). 
Such discursive reconstruction has in the Netherlands been achieved by, on the one hand, legal 
measures and jurisprudence, and, on the other hand, by genetic techniques like PCR, STRs and SGM. 
‘Bodies’ in forensic DNA profiling practices have thus been ‘enacted’ (Mol 2002C009-016) by both a 
discourse of law and the practice of genetics, as ‘forensic genetic bodies’ (see also Hindmarsh this 
volume). Using forensic genetic bodies as a metaphor allows for an association with ‘growing’. Here, 
I have described how forensic genetic bodies in the Netherlands have been ‘growing’. At first, the 
forensic genetic body only consisted of individuals suspected of severe, violent crimes. The forensic 
genetic body then expanded to volume crimes. Next, ‘all individual bodies’ of convicted criminals 
were ushered into the forensic genetic body. Finally, the forensic genetic body is expanding in the 
refrigerators of the NFI with multiple forensic reference bodies at the disposal of the authorities, 
which can be used to create knowledge about them. This raises the question of how large the 
forensic body should be allowed to ‘grow’, and where the limits are. For example, should the 
complete criminal population be included, or the population at large, or all males from 12 to 60 
years of age, and/or every migrant or tourist entering the Netherlands? Until now, this issue has not 
been discussed in the Netherlands; but successive policy makers seem to be driven increasingly by 
the possibilities generated through new DNA profiling technologies and changing ideas about a safe 
society and the ‘war’ against crime and terrorism. 
The DNA database and markers for external visible characteristics thus gain in importance for crime 
investigation. Robust connections between DNA profiling and the police and the Office of Public 
Prosecution have been established and remain in place. Public prosecutors have gained authority to 
issue an order to obtain a saliva sample; police officers with special training are allowed to take 
saliva and hair root samples; DNA markers (or photofits) of external visible characteristics inform 
processes of crime investigation in ‘suspectless’ forensic cases; and new DNA photofits have been 
proven scientifically accurate or are currently being developed. DNA photofits create new and 
complex relations between the process of crime investigation and forensic genetic bodies. 
Turning to issues of DNA photofits, they not only reinforce concerns that DNA profiling and 
databasing could increase stigmatisation and discrimination, but also, as outlined by M’charek 
(2008C009-011: 527), that a result of this practice could be the lumping together of ‘groups of 
individuals … into a racialized suspect population’. Informed by the DNA photofit, detectives can 
concentrate criminal investigations on suspect populations, as illustrated in the example of the 
Zaandam murder case. Individuals who are lumped together in a suspect population can be 
requested to voluntarily supply a sample for DNA profiling in DNA dragnets. This raises several 
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further questions: What happens if an individual refuses? At the least, the individual – the genetic 
suspect – becomes ‘interesting’ for further investigation. If ‘suspicious’ clues are found (for example, 
the genetic suspect has a criminal record or a ‘facebook’ linked to a victim or another suspect), the 
public prosecutor can designate this person as a legal suspect, thereby transforming his ‘body’ into 
‘a forensic genetic body’. 
However, as we have seen, one-trait DNA photofits currently have a maximum accuracy of 93%. 
When traits are combined (for example, ‘sex’, ‘race’, ‘eye colour’ and ‘geographical origin’) in a DNA 
photofit, the statistical likelihood that the perpetrator and the combined DNA photofit actually 
converge decreases, thereby increasing the risk of plainly focussing a DNA dragnet on the wrong 
‘suspect population’. This leads to pressing questions. Is a combined DNA photofit with a low 
accuracy reliable enough to lump individuals into a suspect population, and to ask all individuals in 
that population to volunteer a DNA sample? In addition, should DNA dragnets be made compulsory 
for ‘suspect populations’? Then, what happens to innocent individuals who refuse to deliver? Will 
they automatically be treated as suspects? 
In September 2008, two major Dutch political parties announced that they advocated compulsory 
participation for DNA dragnets.16 So far, the Minister of Justice has rejected such a radical proposal. 
But that proposal is only one of the many implications for governance raised by the expansion of 
DNA databases and profiling, as I have signalled. These are enough to reinforce the view that broad 
and informed public debate is required to better address and resolve these issues. 
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